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ABSTRACT 
 
In this paper, I examine the pattern of earnings management undertaken by firms with a string of at least five-year 
consecutive earnings increases. Results indicate that discretionary accruals of those firms intensify as firms move 
towards the end of an earnings string while the extent of discretionary accruals declines sharply when the string 
ends.  
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1. INTRODUCTION 
 
any firms view attaining a string of consecutive earnings increases (labelled an earnings string) as 
an important goal because the capital market rewards consistent earnings growth and reacts 
negatively to the break to this pattern (Barth, Elliott & Finn 1999). Sustaining earnings growth is 
also important to firm managers who are remunerated based on performance (Ke 2004). While firms with 
competitive advantages in the product market can outperform their competitors (Porter 1985), maintaining a pattern 
of earnings increases is difficult due to the cyclical nature of underlying economic conditions. Thus, firm managers 
are often motivated to take actions to ensure the continuity of an earnings string for as long as possible. One method 
whereby growth in earnings can be artificially sustained is through earnings management. Myers, Myers and 
Skinner (2007) interpret a larger than expected number of firms with earnings momentum as prima facie evidence of 
earnings management. Crucial to this argument is the assumption that insiders have superior information about 
earnings, compared to outside investors. Information asymmetry allows insiders to predict or time the break to an 
earnings string by selling their shares three to nine quarters in advance of actual earnings reports announcing the 
reversal to an upward earnings trend, even though institutional investors normally do not start trading until one or 
two quarters before the break (Ke & Petroni 2004; Ke, Huddart & Petroni 2003). A break to an earnings string may 
eventually occur however, if it cannot be sustained even with the help of earnings management. Although previous 
studies have shown that firms tend to manage earnings in order to extend earnings momentum (Yong 2009; Baik, 
Farber, Johnson & Yi 2008), these studies do not consider the pattern of earnings management along an earnings 
string or when the string breaks. 
 
The purpose of this paper is to fill the gap in the literature by studying earnings management through discretionary 
accruals (or accrual management) undertaken by firms with a string of consecutive earnings increases for at least 
five years (labelled ES firms). Specifically, I address the following research questions: First, do ES firms undertake 
more aggressive earnings management towards the end of an earnings string, compared to the early part of an 
earnings string? Second, is the year immediately following the end of an earnings string (i.e., the break year) 
characterized by a different pattern of earnings management from that within an earnings string?  
 
To test the pattern of earnings management, I partition an earnings string into four sub-periods, i.e., Early-ES (the 
first two years of an earnings string), Mid-ES (from the third year of an earnings string to three years before the 
break), −2Break (two years before the break) and −1Break (one year before the break), and use performance-
matched discretionary accruals (DACCPM) to proxy for earnings management, respectively. I employ a research 
design that treats firm-year observations from Early-ES as the reference group and regress DACCPM separately on 
four indicator variables, representing firm-year observations that fall in the remaining three sub-periods and during 
the break year (labelled MidES, −2Break, −1Break and Break). For a sample of 1,138 earnings strings from 1,043 
firms between 1989 and 2010, I find that after controlling for the potential effects of covariates the coefficient 
M 
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estimates on MidES, −2Break and −1Break are positive and significant in the DACCPM regression. Moreover, both 
the coefficient estimate and the associated t-statistics increase in strength as I move from MidES to −2Break and 
then to −1Break. These results suggest that ES firms start to manage their discretionary accruals in the middle of an 
earnings string and intensify such efforts towards the end. By comparison, the coefficient on the Break variable is 
negative and significant in the DACCPM regression.  
 
All the above results continue to hold when I replicate the analysis separately on the subsets of ES firms that have a 
single earnings string or firms whose earnings strings last exactly five years. They also remain invariant to the use of 
alternative proxies for earnings management, i.e., performance-unadjusted and performance-adjusted earnings 
management measures. This study extends the literature by providing evidence on the progression in the intensity of 
earnings management within an earnings string and by showing that earnings growth may be artificially sustained 
through accruals. 
 
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents a review of related literature and the 
development of hypotheses. Section 3 summarizes data collection procedure and the sample. Section 4 presents 
research design, followed by regression results in Section 5. Section 6 concludes this study. 
 
2. LITERATURE REVIEW AND HYPOTHESIS DEVELOPMENT 
 
Burgstahler and Dichev (1997) find that small positive earnings changes occur more frequently than small negative 
earnings changes. Based on simulations, Myers et al. (2007) also report that the number of firms with a string of 
non-decreasing earnings for at least 20 quarters is much larger than expected. These findings point to the likely 
presence of earnings management to avoid earnings declines. 
 
The notion that firms have the ability to sustain an appearance of continued earnings growth through earnings 
management until it is no longer viable is addressed more formally in two recent studies. Yong (2009) shows that 
firms with earnings growth for at least three consecutive years tend to use large discretionary accruals in the last two 
years of earnings strings. Unlike us, Yong (2009) does not speak to the question of whether earnings management in 
the latter part of an earnings string is different from that in the early part or if there is any change to the pattern of 
earnings management when an earnings string comes to an end, as the final year of his sample period is allowed to 
be part of an earnings string.1 Baik et al. (2008) examine the role of earnings management within an earnings string 
using quarterly data and find that discretionary accruals increase significantly in four quarters before the break 
during which the growth in fundamentals starts to decline. A direct comparison of this study with Baik et al. (2008) 
is difficult however due to differences in research design. In particular, their design is chosen to further examine the 
role of accounting fundamentals in maintaining an earnings string.2 
 
If continuous earning growth is indeed sustained by aggressive earnings management, then firms are more likely to 
manage earnings upwards using accrual management when an earnings string is near the end, as doing so would 
allow insiders to postpone the bad news about an upcoming break to the earnings string and sell their shares at a 
higher price. The above discussion leads to the first hypothesis for the study: 
 
H1: Ceteris paribus, ES firms are expected to report larger discretionary accruals near the end of an earnings string, 
compared to the early part of an earnings string. 
 
Earnings strings normally do not last for an indefinite period of time due to the unpredictability of macroeconomic 
and firm-specific circumstances. Sustaining the appearance of continued earnings growth through aggressive accrual 
management can be difficult if earnings become too low, as accruals are typically reversed in the following period. 
In this case, firms may revert back to “normal” reporting without attempting to manage earnings. Some firms may 
even opt for overly conservative accounting policies by taking a big-bath and manage earnings downward in order to 
increase accounting reserve for future period. Either accrual reversal or a big-bath strategy is expected to result in a 
																																								 																				
1 For example, earnings strings that include the final year of his sample period, i.e., 2005, may have ended in 2005 or continued beyond 2005. 
2 The authors acknowledge that some important accounting fundamentals suppressed from their model (e.g., effective tax rates, the number of 
employees, auditor quality and corporate governance) could not be measured using quarterly data. 
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significant reduction in discretionary accruals during the year when an earnings string is finally broken, compared to 
years leading to the break.3 Thus, I have the next hypothesis for the study: 
 
H2: Ceteris paribus, ES firms are expected to report smaller discretionary accruals during the break year, compared 
to the early part of an earnings string. 
 
3. DATA AND SAMPLE 
 
The initial sample consists of 85,576 firm-year observations over a 22-year (1989-2010) sample period and is 
obtained by applying the following filters to the COMPUSTAT Fundamental Annual database between 1987 and 
2011:4 First, firms must not belong to the financial and regulated industries. Second, firms must not have missing 
data required for the earnings management analysis. Third, each two-digit SIC industry-year group must have at 
least 20 observations to calculate earnings management measures, after deleting earnings changes in the extreme 1 
percent of distribution.  
 
Following the convention of Barth et al. (1999), I work with firms that report at least five-year consecutive increases 
in split-adjusted annual earnings per share. Among the initial sample, 1,417 earnings strings (or 8,932 firm-year 
observations) fit this definition. I then eliminate 279 strings (or 1,836 firm-year observations)5 that do not have an 
identifiable break year to yield a total of 1,138 earnings strings (or 7,096 firm-year observations). Combining these 
observations with another 1,138 observations from the break year yields the final sample of 8,234 firm-year 
observations that I use for testing the predictions of Hypotheses 1 and 2 (labelled ES Sample).  
 
Panel A of Table 1 summarizes the above sample filter rules. As is evident in Panel B of Table 1, the ES Sample 
consists of 1,138 earnings strings from 1,043 distinct firms. Most of the earnings strings represent the first earnings 
string for a particular firm and only a few are the second string (i.e., 1,043 vs. 95). It would appear that firms rarely 
succeed in putting together another earnings string following a break to the first string. In total, 948 distinct firms 
have only one earnings string during the entire sample period and 95 firms have two strings. Panel C presents the 
frequency distribution by the length of earnings strings. Almost half (46.13 percent) of the ES Sample has strings 
that last exactly five years and most of the 1,138 earnings strings (96.83 percent) last 10 years or less. The ES 
Sample is distributed over 35 two-digit SIC industries, where six firms (or 39 firm-year observations) come from the 
Mining & Construction industries and 172 firms (or 1,428 firm-year observations) are drawn from the Retail 
industry (see Panel D). This pattern of industry distribution is largely comparable to that for the overall 
COMPUSTAT population.  
 
  
																																								 																				
3 It is beyond the scope of this study to distinguish between these two competing arguments. 
4 The two endpoints for the sample period, 1989 and 2010, are chosen because firms must have one- to two-year lag data as well as one-year lead 
data to calculate model variables and earnings strings. The starting point of 1989 in particular allows us to calculate total accruals using the 
conceptually superior income statement approach (Hribar and Collins 2002), which requires data from Cash Flow Statement available since 1987. 
5 Among them, 111 come from firms whose earnings strings continued beyond 2010; 93 (3) from firms that have been merged or acquired 
(bankrupt or liquidated); 66 from firms that no longer file with SEC for other reasons; 3 firms have become private companies; and finally 3are 
the second string of firms whose first earnings string have been previously excluded due to missing break year. 
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Table 1. Sample and Data 
Panel A: Sample Selection Procedure 
 
Number of 
Earnings Strings 
Number of 
Observations 
Available observations for calculating earnings stringsa and model 
variables (1989–2010) b  85,576 
Total number of earnings strings (ES)/observations 1,417 8,932 
Less: Earnings strings that continue beyond 2010c (111) (840) 
Less: Earnings strings without an identifiable break yeard (168) (996) 
Number of earnings strings/observations with clearly identifiable break 
year (excluding the break year) 
1,138 7,096 
Number of observations in the break yeare  1,138 ES sample (1989–2010 1,138 8,234 
Notes:  
a. An earnings string (ES) is defined as a string of increases in annual EPS (split-adjusted) for at least five years.  
b. The initial sample is obtained through the following filters from the COMPUSTAT Fundamental Annual Database between 1987 and 2011: 
(1) the financial and regulated industries are deleted, (2) any missing data for calculating variables in earnings management analysis are 
excluded, (3) after trimming earnings changes in the extreme 1 percent of distribution, any two-digit SIC industry-year group with less than 
20 observations are also deleted. Since firms must have two-year lag data as well as one-year lead data to calculate model variables and 
earnings strings in earnings management analysis, the final sample period do not include observations from 1987, 1988, and 2011. 
c.  Earnings strings are deleted if they continue beyond the final year of the sample period (2010) since the break years of such strings are 
unknown. 
d.  Based on DLRSN of COMPUSTAT, 93 firms have been merged or acquired and 3 firms have gone bankrupt or have been liquidated. 3 firms 
have become private companies while 66 companies no longer file with SEC for other reasons or without reasons. Also, if the first string of a 
firm is deleted due to missing break year, then its second string is also excluded (3 firms). 
e. The break year is included in the original ES sample to test the prediction of Hypothesis 2. 
 
Panel B: Composition of the ES Sample (1989–2010)  
 Number Percentage 
Number of 1st earnings string 1,043 91.65% 
Number of 2nd earnings string 95 8.35% 
Total number of earnings strings 1,138 100.00% 
Number of distinct firms with one earnings string 948 90.89% 
Number of distinct firms with two earnings strings 95 9.11% 
Total number of distinct firms with an earnings string 1,043 100.00% 
 
Panel C: Frequency Distribution of the ES Sample by the Length of Earnings Strings 
Length of Earnings Strings Frequency Percentage 
5 525 46.13% 
6 288 25.31% 
7 131 11.51% 
8 80 7.03% 
9 55 4.83% 
10 23 2.02% 
11 12 1.05% 
12 10 0.88% 
13 5 0.44% 
14 3 0.26% 
15 2 0.18% 
16 1 0.09% 
17 0 0.00% 
18 1 0.09% 
19 2 0.18% 
Total 1,138 100.00% 
(Table 1 continued on next page) 
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(Table 1 continued) 
 
Panel D: Frequency Distribution of the ES Sample by Industry (1989–2010) 
Industry 
(two-digit SIC code) 
ES Sample Compustat Populationa 
# of Firms # of Observations # of Observations 
 N % N % N % Mining & Construction 6 0.58% 39 0.47% 1,569 1.83% 
(01, 10-12,14-19)       Oil & Gas (13,29) 47 4.51% 314 3.81% 5,725 6.69% 
Food products (20-21) 41 3.93% 344 4.18% 2,551 2.98% 
Texitiles (22-27) 70 6.71% 544 6.61% 5,251 6.14% 
Chemical products (28) 100 9.59% 839 10.19% 9,417 11.00% 
Manufacturing (30-34) 63 6.04% 491 5.96% 5,286 6.18% 
Computer equipment (35) 83 7.96% 706 8.57% 6,715 7.85% 
Electronic equipment (36) 111 10.64% 843 10.24% 9,223 10.78% 
Transportation (37,39-43) 47 4.51% 384 4.66% 3,662 4.28% 
Scientific instruments (38) 100 9.59% 782 9.50% 7,153 8.36% 
Retail (50-59) 172 16.49% 1,428 17.34% 10,512 12.28% 
Services (70-89) 196 18.79% 1,471 17.86% 17,408 20.34% 
Other (90-99) 7 0.67% 49 0.60% 1,104 1.29% 
Total 1,043 100.00% 8,234 100.00% 85,576 100.00% 
Note: a. This population is based on Panel A of Table 1. 
 
 
4. RESEARCH DESIGN 
 
To test the predictions of Hypotheses 1 and 2, I estimate Equation 1 below by pooling across the ES Sample: 
 𝐷𝐴𝐶𝐶%&'( = 	𝛽, 	+ 	𝛽.𝑀𝑖𝑑𝐸𝑆%& 	+ 	𝛽4 − 2𝐵𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑘%& 	+ 	𝛽; − 1𝐵𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑘%& 	+ 	𝛽=𝐵𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑘%& 	+ 		𝛾.𝑆𝑖𝑧𝑒%&@. 	+	𝛾4𝐵𝑇𝑀%&@. 	+ 	𝛾;𝐿𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑔𝑒%&@. + 	𝛾=𝐶𝐹𝑂%& + 		𝛾G𝐿𝑜𝑠𝑠%&@. 	+ 	𝛾J𝑁𝑒𝑤𝐼𝑠𝑠𝑢𝑒%&	 +	𝛾O𝐿𝑖𝑡𝑖𝑔𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛%& 	+ 	𝛾R𝐵𝑖𝑔𝑁%& + 		𝛾S𝐼𝑛𝑑𝑢𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑦	𝐷𝑢𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑒𝑠		 + 	𝛾&𝑌𝑒𝑎𝑟	𝐷𝑢𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑒𝑠		+		𝜀%& +β.,Litigation`a + β..BigN`a + βdYearDummy + βlIndustryDummy+ε`a (1) 
 
where subscripts i, t and j represent sample firm i in year t and industry j. All the continuous control variables in 
Equation 1 are winsorized at the top and the bottom 1 percent to mitigate the effects of outliers. I use robust standard 
errors to correct for potential problems associated with heteroskedasticity and firm clustering when reporting t-
values (Petersen 2009). Definitions and measurements for all the variables in Equation 1 are summarized in 
Appendix 1. 
 
The dependent variable in Equation 1 is used to proxy for the extent of accrual management. To mitigate potential 
measurement errors discussed in Kothari, Leone and Wasley (2005), I work with performance-matched 
discretionary accruals in the main analysis, calculated using a two-step procedure: First, I estimate the following 
forward-looking modified-Jones model cross-sectionally for each two-digit SIC industry-year group with at least 20 
observations over the ES Sample (Dechow, Richardson & Tuna 2003):   
 qrstuqrtuvw 	= 	𝛼. .qrtuvw 	+ 𝛼4 .yz ∆|tu@∆}~stuqrtuvw + 𝛼; ''~tuqrtuvw +	𝛼= qrstuvwqrtuv + 	𝛼G ∆r|tuw|tu + 𝜀%.& (2) 
 
where TAC is total accruals, defined as income before extraordinary items minus cash flows from operating 
activities; TA denotes total assets; ΔS is changes in sales; ΔREC is changes in account receivables from trade; k is 
the estimated slope coefficient from regressing ΔREC/TA on ΔS/TA for each two-digit SIC industry-year grouping 
and is restricted to between zero and one; PPE denotes gross property, plant and equipment; S denotes sales. 
Residuals from Equation 2 represent discretionary accruals for sample firm i in year t (labelled DACCit). Second, I 
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match every ES firm with a non-ES firm that has the closest return on assets within the same industry-year group.6 
The performance-matched discretionary accruals for ES firm i are its discretionary accruals minus the matched non-
ES firm’s discretionary accruals (labelled DACCPMit). 
 
Model variables in Equation 2 are winsorized at the top and the bottom 1 percent of their respective distributions. 
Appendix 2 reports the mean values of estimated coefficients in Equation 2 and the associated t-statistics calculated 
using the mean value of standard errors across industry-years and the mean value of adjusted R-square. All the 
estimated coefficients have the same signs as those in Dechow et al. (2003) and are significant at the conventional 
levels. 
 
Equation 1 includes four test variables: MidESit, set equal to one if a firm-year observation falls in the third year of 
an earnings string to three years before the break and zero otherwise; −2Breakit (−1Breakit), set equal to one if an 
observation comes from two years (one year) before the break and zero otherwise; and Breakit, set equal to one if an 
observation falls in the break year and zero otherwise. Observations in the first two years of an earnings string serve 
as the reference group. I do not offer any prediction on the first test variable, MidESit. A positive and significant 
coefficient estimate on each of the next two test variables, −2Breakit and −1Breakit, is consistent with the prediction 
of Hypothesis 1, whereas the prediction of Hypothesis 2 implies a significantly negative (insignificant) coefficient 
on the last test variable, Breakit. In the ensuing discussion and all the tables, I report one-tailed p-values if there is a 
prediction and two-tailed p-values otherwise. 
 
Equation 1 also includes eight control variables found to affect a firm’s incentives for accrual management in prior 
literature:7 firm size (Size it-1), book-to-market ratio (BTMit-1), debt-to-asset ratio (Leverageit-1), cash flows from 
operations (CFOit), prior year loss (Lossit-1), new equity issues (NewIssueit), litigation risks (Litigationit) and audit 
quality (BigNit). Since the sample spans over 22 years (1989–2010) and covers a large number of two-digit SIC 
industry groups, I also include Industry dummies and Year dummies in Equation 1 to control for potential industry 
and year effects. To ease exposition, subscripts i and t are suppressed throughout subsequent discussions. 
 
5. MAIN RESULT 
 
5.1 Descriptive Statistics  
 
Table 2 presents the distribution of model variables in Equation 1 over the entire ES Sample of 8,234 firm-year 
observations. The mean value of DACCPM is close to zero (i.e., –0.0143), ranging from –1.8450 to 1.4115. On 
average, ES firms have positive cash flows (CFO = 0.1090), larger market value than book value (BTM = 0.4434) and 
less debts than assets (Leverage = 0.1835). Only a few ES firms have reported loss in the previous year (Loss = 
0.1647) and less than 40 percent of ES firms belong to highly litigious industries (Litigation = 0.3594). The vast 
majority of ES firms issue equity capital in the current period (NewIssue = 0.8528) and retain a Big-N auditor (BigN = 
0.8549).  
 
 
  
																																								 																				
6 Return on assets is defined as net income deflated by opening total assets. In the event of ties among multiple non-ES firms, the firm with the 
closest firm size (i.e., natural logarithm of market value of equity) is selected as the match. 
7 See Cohen and Zarowin (2010); Ball and Shivakumar (2008); Lim and Tan (2008); Barton and Simko (2002); Erickson and Wang (1999); 
Francis, Maydew and Sparks (1999); Healy and Wahlen (1999); Teoh, Welch and Wong (1998); Dechow, Sloan and Sweeny (1996; 1995); 
Dechow (1994); Francis, Philbrick and Schipper (1994). 
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Table 2. Distribution of Model Variables (1989-2010); N = 8,234 firm-year observations). 
 Mean Std Dev Min 25% 50% 75% Max N DACCPM −0.0143  0.1719  −1.8450  −0.0849  −0.0096  0.0587  1.4115  8,234 
Size 5.9940  2.3602  0.6672  4.2906  6.0037  7.6165  11.5930  8,234 
BTM 0.4434  0.4062  −0.5754  0.2097  0.3489  0.5660  2.2390  8,234 
Leverage 0.1835  0.1824  0.0000  0.0181  0.1491  0.2869  0.9290  8,234 
CFO 0.1090  0.1839  −0.8412  0.0660  0.1289  0.1947  0.5111  8,234 
Loss 0.1647  0.3709  0.0000  0.0000  0.0000  0.0000  1.0000  8,234 
NewIssue 0.8528  0.3543  0.0000  1.0000  1.0000  1.0000  1.0000  8,234 
Litigation 0.3594  0.4798  0.0000  0.0000  0.0000  1.0000  1.0000  8,234 
BigN 0.8549  0.3523  0.0000  1.0000  1.0000  1.0000  1.0000  8,234 
Notes: In Table 2, all continuous variables, except for dependent variable in the earnings management regression (DACCPM), are winsorized at 
the top and the bottom 1 percent of their respective distributions.  
 
 
Table 3 reports the correlation matrix among pairs of model variables, other than Industry and Year dummies, in 
Equation 1. The earnings management measure, DACCPM, is negatively associated with Size, CFO and BigN, but 
positively associated Leverage and Loss. The pair-wise Pearson correlation coefficients, appearing above the 
diagonal, are –0.1143, –0.3333, –0.0593, 0.0278 and 0.1145, respectively, all significant at the 5 percent level. 
Spearman-rank correlation coefficients, appearing below the diagonal in Table 3, exhibit qualitatively similar patterns. 
While many control variables are highly correlated, un-tabulated results indicate that the largest variance inflation 
factor and the largest condition index in the DACCPM regression are 1.5665 and 2.2044, respectively. Thus, 
multicollinearity is unlikely to be a major concern.  
 
 
Table 3. Correlation Matrix among Model Variables for the ES Sample (1989–2010; N = 8,234 firm-year observations) 
 DACC
PM Size BTM Leverage CFO Loss NewIssue Litigation BigN 
DACCPM 1.0000 −0.1143  0.0154  0.0278  −0.3333  0.1145  −0.0183  0.0077  −0.0593  <.0001 0.1615  0.0116  <.0001 <.0001 0.0963  0.4863  <.0001 
Size −0.1114  1.0000 −0.3444  −0.0297  0.3238  −0.3832  0.1787  0.0119  0.3670  <.0001 <.0001 0.0070  <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 0.2813  <.0001 
BTM 0.0458  −0.3303  1.0000 −0.0386  −0.0304  0.0670  −0.2447  −0.1128  −0.0349  <.0001 <.0001 0.0005  0.0057  <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 0.0016  
Leverage 0.0345  0.0593  0.0980  1.0000 −0.1221  0.1112  −0.0898  −0.1394  −0.0067  0.0017  <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 0.5439  
CFO −0.3597  0.2997  −0.2388  −0.1879  1.0000 −0.5296  0.0099  −0.0211  0.1376  <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 0.3675  0.0552  <.0001 
Loss 0.0971  −0.3775  −0.0235  0.0404  -0.4271  1.0000 −0.0771  0.1131  −0.1415  <.0001 <.0001 0.0328  0.0002  <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 
NewIssue −0.0166  0.1685  −0.1863  −0.0722  0.0533  −0.0771  1.0000 0.1154  0.0964  0.1320  <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 
Litigation 0.0021  0.0092  −0.1712  −0.1807  0.0531  0.1131  0.1154  1.0000 −0.0033  0.8465  0.4037  <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 0.7662  
BigN −0.0595  0.3561  −0.0052  0.0492  0.1175  −0.1415  0.0964  −0.0033  1.0000 <.0001 <.0001 0.6384  <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 0.7662  
Notes: Pearson correlation coefficients are reported above the diagonal and Spearman rank correlation coefficients are reported below the 
diagonal. The corresponding p-values appear underneath the correlation coefficients.  
 
5.2 Main Results  
 
Table 4 presents the regression results from estimating Equation 1 over the entire ES Sample of 8,234 firm-year 
observations. After controlling for the potential effects of covariates, I find that the coefficient estimates on −2Break 
and −1Break are all positive and significant at the 1 percent level (one-tailed), whereas that on the Break variable is 
significantly negative at the 1 percent level based on a one-tailed test (−2Break = 0.0274, t-stat. = 4.48; −1Break = 
0.0386, t-stat. = 5.65; Break = –0.0230, t-stat. = –3.05; see Panel B). While no prediction is offered on MidES, it is 
also significantly positive at the 5 percent level (two-tailed). Compared to the early part of an earnings string, firms 
would appear to undertake a progressively higher level of accrual management as I move towards the end of an 
earnings string but significantly less in the break year, as predicted in Hypotheses 1 and 2.  
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Table 4. Main Results 𝐷𝐴𝐶𝐶%&'( = 𝛽, + 𝛽.𝑀𝑖𝑑𝐸𝑆%& + 𝛽4 − 2𝐵𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑘%& + 𝛽; − 1𝐵𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑘%& 	+ 𝛽=𝐵𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑘%& 	+ 𝛾.𝑆𝑖𝑧𝑒%&@. +𝛾4𝐵𝑇𝑀%&@. + 𝛾;𝐿𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑔𝑒%&@. + 𝛾=𝐶𝐹𝑂%& 	+ 𝛾G𝐿𝑜𝑠𝑠%&@. 	+ 𝛾J𝑁𝑒𝑤𝐼𝑠𝑠𝑢𝑒%& + 𝛾O𝐿𝑖𝑡𝑖𝑔𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛%& +	𝛾R𝐵𝑖𝑔𝑁%& + 𝛾S	𝐼𝑛𝑑𝑢𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑦	𝐷𝑢𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑒𝑠 + 𝛾&	𝑌𝑒𝑎𝑟	𝐷𝑢𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑒𝑠		+𝜀%& 
 Prediction Coefficient t-statistics p-value Test Variables     MidES ? 0.0113  2.20  0.0283 −2Break + 0.0274  4.48  <.0001 −1Break + 0.0386  5.65 <.0001 
Break − −0.0230  −3.05  0.0012  
Control Variables     Size  −0.0016  −1.35 0.1758 BTM  0.0027  0.40  0.6920 Leverage  −0.0168  −1.08  0.2825 CFO  −0.3793  −12.66 <.0001 Loss  −0.0428  −5.67  <.0001 NewIssue  −0.0062  −1.19 0.2350 
Litigation  −0.0181  −2.77 0.0058 
BigN  −0.0065  −0.94 0.3452 Year Dummies  Yes Industry Dummies  Yes Adj. R2  13.38% N  8,234 obs. (1,043 firms) Notes: In Table 4, the dependent variable is DACCPM, representing performance-matched discretionary accruals, is defined as the difference 
between an ES sample firm i’s discretionary accruals and the discretionary accruals of a non-ES firm that has the closest return on asset within 
the same industry-year group. Test variables are MidES, −2Break, −1Break, and Break, representing the period from the third year of an earnings 
string to three years before the break, two years before the break, one year before the break and the break year of an earnings string, respectively. 
All t-values are reported using robust standard errors to correct heteroskedasticity problem and firm clustering effect. The p-values are one-tailed 
if there is a prediction, and two-tailed otherwise. 
 
5.3 Robustness Checks 
 
Recall from Panel B of Table 1 that 95 of the 1,043 ES firms in the ES Sample have two earnings strings during the 
22-year (1989–2010) sample period. On the one hand, prior history of earnings strings may subject these ES firms to 
closer scrutiny from auditors and regulators, reducing their incentives for using earnings management to sustain the 
second earnings string. On the other hand, one may argue that ES firms with multiple earnings strings likely face 
heavy pressure from investors to ensure that the second string does not break, as did the previous one. To provide a 
“cleaner” analysis of earnings management hypothesis, I now replicate Equation 1 on a reduced sample of 948 firms 
with a single earnings string, or equivalently 6,867 firm-year observations (labelled Subsample 1).8 As is evident in 
Panel A of Table 5, all the main regression results continue to hold. In particular, the coefficient estimates on −2Break and −1Break in both sets of regressions are significantly positive at the 1 percent level (one-tailed), 
whereas that on the Break variable is significantly negative.9  
 
In selecting the ES Sample, I have imposed a minimum length of five years on earnings strings, but not an upper 
bound. Just over half of the ES Sample, or 613 out of 1,138 earnings strings, last from six to 19 years, whereas the 
remaining 525 earnings strings have a length of exactly five years (see Panel C of Table 1). This implies significant 
variations in the length of Mid-ES, ranging from one year for a five-year earnings string to 15 years for a 19-year 
earnings string. To address the concern that the results may be sensitive to cross-sectional variations in the length of 
Mid-ES, I impose another requirement that all earnings strings have the same length of five years, thus forcing Mid-
ES to consist of exactly one year for all firms. This requirement reduces the sample to 505 firms, or equivalently 
																																								 																				
8 Subsample 1 is smaller than the original ES sample by 1,367 observations, of which 704 relate to the first earnings string and 663 to the second 
string. 
9 The coefficient estimates (t-stat.) on MidES, −2Break, −1Break and Break are 0.0122 (2.07), 0.0278 (4.02), 0.0404 (5.16) and –0.0202 (–2.37), 
respectively. 
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3,150 firm-year observations (labelled Subsample 2).10 Re-estimating Equation 1, I find that the main regression 
results on −2Break, −1Break and Break continue to hold (see Panel B, Table 5).11 
 
Up till now, I have used performance-matched discretionary accruals as the measure of earnings management. While 
matching each ES firm with a non-ES firm along the industry, year and firm performance dimensions has the 
advantage of holding constant potential confounding factors that may also contribute to cross-sectional variations in 
earnings management, this design assumes an equal number of ES and non-ES firms, an assumption that is unlikely 
to be representative of the actual distribution of the two types of firms in the market. To ensure that my findings 
remain robust, I replicate all the regression analyses using performance-unadjusted and performance-adjusted 
accrual management measures, labelled DACC and DACCPA, respectively. I define DACC as residuals from 
Equation 2 and follow Francis, LaFond, Olsson and Schipper (2005) to define DACCPA as the difference between 
discretionary accruals of ES firm i and the median discretionary accruals of industry-return on assets decile 
excluding firm i (also see Cahan & Zhang 2006).  
 
Results from estimating the DACC regression over the entire ES Sample of 8,234 firm-year observations appear in 
Panel C of Table 5. The corresponding results from estimating the DACCPA regression appear in Panel D. Consistent 
with the main results, the coefficient estimates on the two key pre-break test variables,	−2Break and −1Break, in 
both regressions are positive and significant at the 1 percent level (one-tailed). Moreover, the magnitude of 
coefficient estimate increases as I move from MidES to −2Break before reaching their peak at −1Break.12 The 
coefficient estimates on the Break variable are significantly negative at the 1 percent level (one-tailed) in both 
regressions. 
 
 
Table 5. Results based on Robustness Checks 
Panel A. Subsample 1 (One Earnings String Only) 
Test Variables Coeff. t-stat p-value 
EM Regression    MidES 0.0122  2.07  0.0385 −2Break 0.0278  4.02  <.0001 −1Break 0.0404  5.16 <.0001 
Break −0.0202  −2.37 0.0090  
Adj. R2 12.99% 
N 6,867 obs. (948 firms) 
 
Panel B. Subsample 2 (Five-Year Earnings String Only) 
Test Variables Coeff. t-stat p-value 
EM Regression    
MidES 0.0142  1.50  0.1331 −2Break 0.0256  2.67  0.0040  −1Break 0.0427  4.08 <.0001 
Break −0.0287  −2.44 0.0075  
Adj. R2 13.13% 
N 3,150 obs. (505 firms) 
(Table 5 continued on next page) 
	 	
																																								 																				
10 Subsample 2 consists of 2,625 firm-year observations within an earnings string (525 strings x 5 years) and 525 observations from the break 
year for a total of 3,150. Among the 525 earnings strings, 20 represent the second earnings string for a particular firm. Thus, the number of 
distinct firms is 505 (525 – 20 = 505). 
11 The coefficient estimates (t-stat.) on −2Break, −1Break and Break are 0.0256 (2.67), 0.0427 (4.08) and –0.0287 (–2.44), respectively. 
12 Take the DACC regression for example, the coefficient estimates (t-stat.) on MidES, −2Break and −1Break are 0.0033 (1.07), 0.0219 (5.39) 
and 0.0445 (8.78), respectively. 
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(Table 5 continued) 
 
Panel C. Alternative Measure: Performance-Unadjusted Discretionary Accruals (DACC) 
Test Variables Coeff. t-stat p-value 
EM Regression    MidES 0.0033  1.07  0.2871 −2Break 0.0219  5.39  <.0001 −1Break 0.0445  8.78 <.0001 
Break −0.0296  −5.32 <.0001 
Adj. R2 8.78% 
N 8,234 obs. (1,043 firms) 
 
Panel D. Alternative Measure: Performance-Adjusted Discretionary Accruals (DACCPA) 
Test Variables Coeff. t-stat p-value 
EM Regression    
MidES 0.0027  0.92  0.3580 −2Break 0.0196  5.28  <.0001 −1Break 0.0388  8.28 <.0001 
Break −0.0264  −5.21 <.0001 
Adj. R2 20.71'% 
N 8,234 obs. (1,043 firms) 
 
 
In Panel A, Subsample 1 consists of ES firms with only one earnings string (see Panel B of Table 1). In Panel B, 
Subsample 2 consists of ES firms with an earnings string that lasts exactly five years (see Panel C of Table 1). Each 
panel shows the regression results based on performance-matched discretionary accruals (DACCPM). DACCPM is 
defined as the difference between an ES sample firm i’s discretionary accruals and the discretionary accruals of a non-
ES firm that has the closest return on asset within the same industry-year group. 
  
Panels C-D report results based on performance-unadjusted discretionary accruals (DACC) and those based on 
performance-adjusted discretionary accruals (DACCPA). DACC is defined as the residuals from Equation 2 while 
DACCPA is calculated as the difference between an ES sample firm i’s discretionary accruals and the median 
discretionary accruals for its industry-ROA decile excluding firm i.  
 
Test variables in Panels A-D are MidES, −2Break, −1Break, and Break, denoting the period from the third year of an 
earnings string to three years before the break, two years before the break, one year before the break and the break 
year of an earnings string, respectively. All t-values are reported using robust standard errors to correct 
heteroscedasticity problem and firm clustering effect. The p-values are one-tailed if there is a prediction, and two-
tailed otherwise. To conserve the space, results on test variables are reported. 
 
 Taken together, I find consistent support for the predictions of Hypotheses 1 and 2. Compared to the early part of an 
earnings string, ES firms undertake a significantly higher level of accrual starting from the third year of the earnings 
string until the end, and the intensity of earnings management peaks in the year right before the break. During the 
break year, ES firms significantly reduce the extent of discretionary accruals from the level in Early-ES. These results 
extend to cases where I limit ES firms to include those with one earnings string only or firms whose strings last 
exactly five years. They are also invariant to the choice of proxies for discretionary accruals (i.e., performance-
matched vs. performance-unadjusted or performance-adjusted). 
 
6. CONCLUSION 
 
In this paper, I have examined the pattern of earnings management for firms reporting a string of at least five-year 
consecutive earnings increases (ES firms) over a 22-year (1989–2010) period. Results indicate that ES firms 
increase the intensity of discretionary accruals as they move towards the end of an earnings string. However, ES 
firms sharply reduce the level of discretionary accruals when the string finally comes to an end. The pattern of 
earnings management along an earnings string continues to hold regardless of sample choices (i.e., multiple earnings 
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strings of varying lengths vs. one earnings string only or five-year earnings strings only) or how I calculate earnings 
management measures (i.e., performance-matched vs. performance-unadjusted or performance-adjusted). 
As directions for future research, it would be interesting to see whether the presence of stock options has any effect 
on the incentive by managers of ES firms to sustain an earnings string through earnings management and if different 
patterns of earnings management surrounding the break to an earnings string would emerge when the break is 
accompanied by CEO changes. It would also be useful to study the characteristics of ES firms that resort to earnings 
management. 
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